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[/] [openrisc/] [trunk/] [gnu-dev/] [or1k-gcc/] [libgo/] [go/] [crypto/] [rsa/] [pkcs1v15.go] - Rev 747
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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.package rsaimport ("crypto""crypto/subtle""errors""io""math/big")// This file implements encryption and decryption using PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.// EncryptPKCS1v15 encrypts the given message with RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.// The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus minus 11 bytes.// WARNING: use of this function to encrypt plaintexts other than session keys// is dangerous. Use RSA OAEP in new protocols.func EncryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) (out []byte, err error) {k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8if len(msg) > k-11 {err = MessageTooLongError{}return}// EM = 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || Mem := make([]byte, k-1)em[0] = 2ps, mm := em[1:len(em)-len(msg)-1], em[len(em)-len(msg):]err = nonZeroRandomBytes(ps, rand)if err != nil {return}em[len(em)-len(msg)-1] = 0copy(mm, msg)m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)out = c.Bytes()return}// DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.// If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.func DecryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (out []byte, err error) {valid, out, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)if err == nil && valid == 0 {err = DecryptionError{}}return}// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey decrypts a session key using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.// If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.// It returns an error if the ciphertext is the wrong length or if the// ciphertext is greater than the public modulus. Otherwise, no error is// returned. If the padding is valid, the resulting plaintext message is copied// into key. Otherwise, key is unchanged. These alternatives occur in constant// time. It is intended that the user of this function generate a random// session key beforehand and continue the protocol with the resulting value.// This will remove any possibility that an attacker can learn any information// about the plaintext.// See ``Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA// Encryption Standard PKCS #1'', Daniel Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology// (Crypto '98).func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, key []byte) (err error) {k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8if k-(len(key)+3+8) < 0 {err = DecryptionError{}return}valid, msg, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)if err != nil {return}valid &= subtle.ConstantTimeEq(int32(len(msg)), int32(len(key)))subtle.ConstantTimeCopy(valid, key, msg)return}func decryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (valid int, msg []byte, err error) {k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8if k < 11 {err = DecryptionError{}return}c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(ciphertext)m, err := decrypt(rand, priv, c)if err != nil {return}em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)secondByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 2)// The remainder of the plaintext must be a string of non-zero random// octets, followed by a 0, followed by the message.// lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the zero.// index: the offset of the first zero byte.var lookingForIndex, index intlookingForIndex = 1for i := 2; i < len(em); i++ {equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0)index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals0, i, index)lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals0, 0, lookingForIndex)}valid = firstByteIsZero & secondByteIsTwo & (^lookingForIndex & 1)msg = em[index+1:]return}// nonZeroRandomBytes fills the given slice with non-zero random octets.func nonZeroRandomBytes(s []byte, rand io.Reader) (err error) {_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s)if err != nil {return}for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {for s[i] == 0 {_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s[i:i+1])if err != nil {return}// In tests, the PRNG may return all zeros so we do// this to break the loop.s[i] ^= 0x42}}return}// These are ASN1 DER structures:// DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {// digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,// digest OCTET STRING// }// For performance, we don't use the generic ASN1 encoder. Rather, we// precompute a prefix of the digest value that makes a valid ASN1 DER string// with the correct contents.var hashPrefixes = map[crypto.Hash][]byte{crypto.MD5: {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},crypto.SHA1: {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14},crypto.SHA256: {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},crypto.SHA384: {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},crypto.SHA512: {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},crypto.MD5SHA1: {}, // A special TLS case which doesn't use an ASN1 prefix.crypto.RIPEMD160: {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x28, 0xcf, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x31, 0x04, 0x14},}// SignPKCS1v15 calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN from RSA PKCS#1 v1.5.// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the// given hash function.func SignPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte) (s []byte, err error) {hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))if err != nil {return}tLen := len(prefix) + hashLenk := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8if k < tLen+11 {return nil, MessageTooLongError{}}// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || Tem := make([]byte, k)em[1] = 1for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {em[i] = 0xff}copy(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)copy(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)c, err := decrypt(rand, priv, m)if err == nil {s = c.Bytes()}return}// VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by// returning a nil error.func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte) (err error) {hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))if err != nil {return}tLen := len(prefix) + hashLenk := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8if k < tLen+11 {err = VerificationError{}return}c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, c)em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || Tok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 1)ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[k-tLen-1], 0)for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0xff)}if ok != 1 {return VerificationError{}}return nil}func pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash crypto.Hash, inLen int) (hashLen int, prefix []byte, err error) {hashLen = hash.Size()if inLen != hashLen {return 0, nil, errors.New("input must be hashed message")}prefix, ok := hashPrefixes[hash]if !ok {return 0, nil, errors.New("unsupported hash function")}return}
